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Resumen: El propósito del trabajo es examinar algunos 
programas de estabilización y/o ajuste estruc-
tural adoptados en Latinoamérica (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil y Colombia) en el periodo 1984¬
1988. El programa de Israel también se incluye 
pues representa un caso interesante de compa-
ración. Comounresultadodelanálisis, un modelo 
de políticas combinadas (con características 
ortodoxas y heterodoxas) es propuesto. 
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to review some 
stabilization and/or structural adjustment 
programs adopted in Latin America (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia) during the period 
1984-1988. The program of Israel is also in-
cluded because it represents an interesting case 
for comparison. As a result of the analysis, a 
model of combined policies (i.e. with orthodox 
and heterodox features) is proposed. 
Introduction 
In the period 1984-1987, some Latin American countries needed to adopt 
stabilization programs due to serious structural misalignments, which be-
came evident at the outburst of the international debt crises in 1982. Main 
misalignments included overvaluation of the domestic currencies and exces-
ses in public expenditure, which prompted high deficits in the current account 
of the balance of payments and an acceleration of inflation. 
* A version of this paper was presented at the 6th World Congress of the Econo-
metric Society, Barcelona-Spain (August, 1990). The author is indebted to J.C. Jaramillo 
and to some participants of that congress for helpful discussions and suggestions. 
However, remaining errors and opinions are my own responsibility. 
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In most cases, the programs adopted the form of "packages of economic 
policies" that were to be implement promptly (i.e. as a shock treatment) and 
this occurred as inflation accelerated. Only in a few cases (e.g. Colombia) 
policies were directed to correct structural misalignments regarding the real 
exchange rate and the fiscal deficit. It is clear, however, that in none of these 
cases it became possible to "liberalize" the goods and/or the capital markets 
in a significant way and, therefore, efficiency gains did not occurred.
1 
The purpose of this paper it to review the fundamental characteristics of 
some of these programs and, by comparison, extract some lessons for the 
1990s. The first section analyses the experiences of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, and Israel during the period 1984-1988.
2 The second and third 
sections are devoted to extract some lessons and an attempted is made to 
depict a stabilization program of combined-policies (i.e. with elements of 
orthodox and heterodox programs). This combined program blends aggregate 
demand policies (focused on the real exchange rate and the fiscal deficit) with 
policies directed to manage expectatbns. The final section presents conclusions. 
1. Stabilization Policies and Macroeconomic Adjustment 
1.1. Characterization of Proqrams 
The literature distinguishes between orthodox and heterodox price stabiliza-
tion programs. The former emphasizes the fiscal and monetary discipline and 
the need to maintain the real exchange rate aligned (in a dynamic sense). The 
core of the orthodox programs lays in controlling excesses of aggregate 
demand as the way of reaching disinflation. Expenditure reduction and 
expenditure switching policies are the norm. 
It is recognized that this therapy is likely to produced recession due to 
an increase in real interest rates and to a reduction of real wages. Here the 
elements of surprise and continuity are crucial and, to say it in an informal 
manner, it constitutes and adjustment "without searching for consensus" to 
carry it over (i.e. businessmen and unions are not usually consulted). 
In some circumstances the element of surprise constitutes and edge for 
its implementation since it does not depend on reaching a "social pact" for 
disinflation, precisely when is very difficult to achieve it (at the verge of 
1 The Chilean case is not being considered here since such reforms were not the 
result of a stabilization program, but of a long-term structural reform. 
2 Israel is an interesting case to compared with. The cases of trade liberalization 
(1984-1986) and of the "Pacto de Solidaridad Económica" (1987) in Mexico and of 
populist policies in Peru (1985-1987) were not included due to difficulties in their 
characterization and/or in collecting detail information. STABILIZATION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 211 
hyper-inflation). Theneed of continuity, however, represents a great challenge 
since, regardless of the economic team endurance, "social tensions" tend to 
develop, especially in democratic societies, due to both real wage reduction 
and an increase of unemployment spurred by recession. The absence of 'social 
pacts' and the burden of economic austerity (i.e. more saving, less consump-
tion) turn orthodox policies highly unpopular and have been historically 
associated with those dictated by multilateral institutions. 
Heterodox programs, by contrast, emphasize the need to manage expec-
tations regarding prices, wages, and exchange rate. The main idea is that at 
high levels of inflation "inertia" dominates expectations. The elements of 
inertia, namely the coverage of indexation and the frequency of the adjust-
ments, tend to increase. Under such circumstances, there is a need for reaching 
a "social pact" in order to "break the memory of the system" (Frenkel, 1988; 
Bruno, 1990). The final success of any wage-price agreement hinges on its 
credibility and its consistency with the macroeconomic structure (relative 
prices, productivity, etc.). Under this approach, the reason for not emphasiz-
ing aggregate demand control (via real exchange rate depreciation and fiscal 
deficit reduction) is to avoid the short-run costs of a recession.
3 
In short, the spirit of the heterodox programs resemble the old "income 
and wage policies" (Okun, 1978) which insists in the possibility of adopting 
'imaginative adjustments' to avoid the recession; while the orthodox 
programs trust the traditional view that enduring benefits (those deriving 
from structural adjustments) can not be achieved without some short-run costs. 
1.2. Results of Some Programs 
Table 1 shows a synopsis of the stabilization or adjustment programs adopted 
in Argentina, Brazil, Israel, Bolivia and Colombia during the period 1984¬
1988. The first three cases can be characterized as heterodox price stabilization 
programs, which included some elements of macroeconomic adjustment, 
specially in the case of Israel. Bolivia is also a case of a price stabilization 
program, but of the orthodox type (i.e. drastic corrections in the real exchange 
rate and the fiscal deficit). 
Colombia, by contrast, did not adopt a price stabilization program -in 
fact, its average inflation rate did not surpassed 25% annually, compared to 
the 250% annually that reported the other countries of the sample-; it was a 
JKiguel and Liviatan (1988, p. 287) used a different and interesting taxonomy based 
on the existence of nominal anchors and its relationship with the fiscal deficit and the 
real exchange rate. Their analysis of inflationary rigidities in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico in early 1980s is contrasted with the successful Bolivian case, coming to the 
conclusion that "it is essential ... to supplement fiscal measures with appropriate 
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case of correcting structural misalignments in real exchange rate and in the 
fiscal balance without the need to recur to a "stand-by agreement" with the 
IMF. The Colombian program is better characterized as a 'tailor made' or-
thodox program which required only the monitoring of the IMF; in fact, the 
last stand-by agreement between Colombia and the Fund goes back to 1974. 
However, the study of the Colombian experience, as that of Chile (Kiguel and 
Liviatan, 1988), might be useful to understand chronic inflation process, which, 
paradoxically, have revealed harder to overcome than hyperinflation process. 
The upper part of Table 1 presents the evolution of some macroeconomic 
performance indicators in three moments: Initial (before the program); 
Medium (a year after the launch of the program); and Last (the figure observed 
during/or at the end of 1988). Here the idea is to compare such figures as to 
be able to come with a broad idea of failure or success for each program. 
Table 1 
Synopsis of Some Recent Stabilization Programs 1984-1988 
Argentina  Brazil  Israel  Bolivia  Colombia 
(Date of the Launch)  1985:6  1986:2  1985:7  1985:8  1984:6 
1. Basic Indicators 
Monthly Inflation Rate %  (I)  30  14  26  30  1 
(M)  3  4  2  1  2 
(L)  10  29  2  2  2 
GDP Real Growth Rate %  (I)  -5  8  7  -1  4 
(M)  6  8  1  -3  5 
(L)  0  0  4  2  4 
Fiscal Deficit/GDP %  (I)  20  4  15  36  4 
(M)  4  7  +1  3  1 
(L)  7  7  1  5  2 
Current Account/GDP %  (I)  +5  2  +5  12  7 
(M)  4  0  +5  14  +1 
(L)  6  +2  3  8  1 
External Debt/GDP %  (I)  81  49  103  146  45 
(M)  67  42  89  143  43 
(L)  74  40  79  133  42 
Real Exchange Rate Index  (I)  100  100  100  100  100 
(M)  91  94  92  130  132 
(L)  95  105  100  125  139 
Premium in Blackmarket  (I)  30  33  32  1500  22 
Exchange %  (M)  2  100  7  0  5 
(L)  10  32  0  0  -1 STABILIZATION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 213 
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Note: Values refer to (I)nitial: immediately before the program; (Medium: a year after 
launching the program; and (L)ast: the figure observed during/or at the end of 1988. These 
figures are only approximate and in some cases are not strictly comparable due to definition 
problems. 
Sources: Constructed based on Fischer (1987); Cardoso and Dornbusch (1987); Frenkel (1987); 
Heymann (1987); Sachs (1987); Blejer and Cheasty (1988); CEPA (1988); World Bank (1988); Bruno 
and Piterman (1988); Cukierman (1988); Modiano (1988); Morales (1988); Garay and Carras-
quilla (1987). 
For those countries which adopted price stabilization programs, the 
broad judgment of success has to be endorsed by a sustained disinflation 
process. The cases of the Austral Plan (Argentina) and the Cruzado Plan 
(Brazil) reveal clear failures: the initial success had vanished by the end of 
1988 (see Table 1). Israel, by contrast, seemed to have achieved success. In our 
sample, the score is that 1 out of 3 heterodox programs tended to be successful; 
and if Peru were to be included, it would be 1 out of 4. Furthermore, Israel's 
case lends some of its success to substantial foreign aid and to a mix of policies 214 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
including orthodox features (Fischer, 1987). Finally, among the programs oi 
price stabilization, Bolivia constitutes a clean success of an orthodox program. 
The goal of stabilization, however, can not be assessed disregarding the 
outcome of other economic variables. For example, in Table 1, it can be 
observed that Bolivia and Argentina experienced great costs in terms of GDP 
growth, while Brazil's was not so severe (although registered zero growth in 
1988). Output cost for Israel was low. 
The abundant literature (see sources of Table 1) permits to conclude that 
the failures of Argentina and Brazil were rooted in their lack of compromise 
to reduce the fiscal deficit and, to a lesser extent, to correct the appreciation 
of the exchange rate. It is clear that the initial success in managing expecta-
tions, through price controls and disindexation programs, became incom-
patible with the level of public expenditure and the relative price of tradeable 
/non-tradeable goods. Israel and Bolivia achieved substantial adjustments in 
both the fiscal deficit and the real exchange rate and their current accounts 
improved accordingly. 
It is worth to note that pressures for further devaluation of the domestic 
currencies of Argentina and Brazil did not disappeared, since the "premiums" 
in the exchange black-market were as high as 10 and 32 percentage points, 
respectively. In the mean time, in Israel and Bolivia such a "premium" 
practically tradeable (see Table 1). 
Finally, it is important to highlight that some of the initial efforts made 
by Argentina and Brazil were offset by the external debt burden and that the 
relative success of the Bolivian program still depends on the course of 
international capital markets. 
The orthodox structural adjustment adopted in Colombia was a relative 
success: the real exchange rate depreciated by 40% (with respect to a weighted 
average of trade-partners' currencies) and the fiscal deficit reduced from 4% 
to 2% in the period 1984-1988 (see Table 1). It is clear that the output cost was 
also low; in fact, Colombia reported the highest growth rate in Latin America 
during the 1980s (3.3% per-year).
4 
To summarize, our analyses of macroeconomic performance indicates 
that those countries that adopted orthodox programs (Bolivia and Colombia) 
or took key elements of such an approach (Israel) were relatively successful 
in their objectives of prices stabilization and/or structural adjustments. By 
contrast, those heterodox programs which only emphasized the management 
4 This good performance of Colombia is often attributed to drug proceeds; how-
ever, such simplification forgets that many other economies of the region are also 
affected, in some areas even more intensely, and still behaved poorly. See, for example, 
The Economist (October 8/88 pp.25-28) for comparisons regarding the influence of drugs 
in the economies of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. STABILIZATION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 215 
of expectations not only failed in disinflating their economies but also in-
curred in the costs of recession. 
2. Policy Instruments 
In the lower part of Table 1 appears a characterization of the programs (heterodox 
versus orthodox) and a brief classification of the policy instruments used in each 
case. As it can be observed, heterodox programs rely on freezing prices and wages 
(also the exchange rate) and a series of mechanisms to disindexing the economy. 
Key features of such instruments can be summarized as follows. 
2.1. Prices 
In contrast to traditional theories on how to end hyperinflation -i.e. stop issuing 
money to finance the fiscal deficit (Sargent, 1982)-, heterodox programs adopted 
price freezing policies. The idea was to return to the time when price setting was 
made at the micro-economic level (based on average, marginal costs and com-
petition, not based on a collective "hysteria"). Price freezing intended to anchored 
expectations of all agents and avoid the increasing 'dollarization' of the 
economies, which affected the collection of the "inflationary tax".
5 Price freezing 
policies, however, tended to weaken and ended-up as a scheme of administered 
prices, which are usually very inefficient (Heyman, 1987). 
2.2. Wages 
Many of the comments just made for prices apply here as well. The difference 
stems from the existence of contract labors, which usually have indexation 
and "trigger" clauses. If inflation is high, governments are likely to attempted 
to level-off wages across the economy before the wage freeze. This situation 
represents a paradox: by doing so credibility is weakened (Blejer and Cheasty, 
1988) but if no action is taken wages disparities would tend to work against 
the freeze (Abraham, 1987). The level of the freeze is also a problem that finally 
affects the whole structure of relative prices (Cardoso and Dornbusch, 1987; 
Frenkel, 1987). This is definitely one of the variables more difficult to align 
but it is a vital one. 
5 The problem of dollarization has different stages: the most common is when the 
domestic currency is replaced by the dollar as the unit of account; a second stage arrives 
when it is replaced in its function of "store of value" and, a third occurs when loosing 
its role of "unit of transaction". 216 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
2.3. Exchange Rates 
Given the high dollarization of hyperinflated economies, one way of anchor-
ing expectations might be through stopping nominal devaluation of the 
domestic currency (i.e. fixing the exchange rate). However, the "inertia" in 
prices might be anchored to the black-market exchange rate and not to the 
official rate, so additional policies will be needed to affect the former. "Inertia" 
is very likely to stem from other sources, so betting on a freeze of the official 
exchange rate soon will produce an overvaluation of the real exchange rate 
and a loss of credibility if attempts are made to correct the real exchange rate. 
This is what usually happens and the system collapses into a "trotting-peg", 
which is depicted with an (X) in the lower part of Table 1. Israel faces this 
possibility while Argentina and Brazil collapsed into "trotting-pegs" by the late 
1980s. Chile in 1978-1980 also fail with the so-called tablita (McKinnon, 1988). 
2.4. Disindexation 
If the stage of anchoring expectations is successfully achieved, the problem 
of indexation remains. Breaking the system of automatic readjustments re-
quires dismounting the formal (i.e. clauses) and informal (i.e. expectations) 
aspects of indexation (Clavijo, 1989). The former are "insurance" for the 
workers against a failure of the program and the experience shows a great 
difficulty in removing such clauses. 
Disindexing the financial system has proved more successful, based on 
"conversion tables" that avoid real transfers between borrowers and lenders (as 
implemented in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel). It is very important to make 
provisions to avoid a sudden increase of the real interest rate as disinflation 
occurs, for instance by adopting "tables that look forward" (McKinnon, 1988; 
Corden, 1988). 
2.5. Monetary Reform 
As shown in Table 1 (part 2), monetary reforms also formed important part of the 
instruments directed towards managing expectations (in Argentina and Brazil). 
This is another element if the fight against dollarization. It is clear, however, that 
it will only help in the "psychology of daily transactions", but recovering the 
domestic currency as "unit of transaction" requires success in the other areas. 
3. Sketching a Program of Combined Policies for Disinflation 
It should be possible to combined the imaginative instruments of heterodox 
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to control the aggregate demand to disinflate an economy.
6 However, this 
might be more difficult to do in economies with moderate inflationary process 
than in hyped-economies. 
The main idea is that, as aggregate demand is kept under control by 
reducing the fiscal deficit, expectations should be over-determined by an-
nouncing goals in macro-variables. Such goals are given in terms of pre-fixing 
some prices and wages rates of adjustment (once a year), while the nominal 
depreciation of the home currency (except at the launching of the program) 
is let free to maintain the real exchange rate level. All agents' expectations 
should be "looking forward". 
If the industry begins to set the prices (not controlled by the government) 
based on micro-economic decisions and public wages are over-determined by 
the government at the beginning of a given year, money supply should be set 
accordingly to those parameters. Some industries will seek additional rents by 
increasing prices, most of which will not be frozen. The hope is that excess 
demand, at those "above equilibrium prices", will not show up, provided that 
money supply is kept tight. This is a gradual disinflation program which does 
not pretend to reach a zero inflation rate; does not rely on keeping prices frozen, 
but announces targets of money supply and sets an initial rate of depreciation 
which should be consistent with a feasible level of real exchange rate. Nominal 
depreciation will only be reduced if the program shows an initial success in terms 
of disinflation, as occurred in Korea (McKinnon, 1988). 
As long as workers insists in their "insurance" against program failures 
(through readjustment clauses), governments should use flexibility in their 
nominal depreciation as their "insurance" against low credibility or even against 
a partial success. If this type of program proves credible in the initial stage, 
disindexation policies should be enforced immediately, as explained before. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that an enduring success has to rely on policies 
that promote competition at the international level (in goods and capital markets). 
A recent study concluded, however, that price stabilization was a sine-qua-non 
condition for successful programs of trade liberalization (McKinnon, 1988). 
3.1. The Model 
In order to illustrate the possible effects of a program like the one sketched 
above, for a country with a chronic inflation rate, let's say of 25% per-year, we 
6 This idea, per-se, is not new. For instance, Bruno ( 1988, p. 291) mentioned that in 
February of 1981 he explained, using "hand-waving" arguments, the "idea of coupling 
a massive budget cut with a simultaneous coordinated freeze on all nominal magnitudes 
as a signalling and expectations-changing device." Our intended contribution here is 
then to spell-out how this might be done. 218 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
developed a simple macro-model (details appear in the Appendix). The 
model combines policies that manage price expectations and maintains the 
real exchange rate. In what follows we shortly explain the role of the main 
variables and some possible results. 
3.1.1. Inflation 
Following the "Augmented Phillips Curve", the model postulates that if the 
rate of unemployment is lower than its "natural rate" (let's say 8%), inflation-
ary pressures will emerge via increases in the nominal wages. These pres-
sures, however, could be compensated by increases in labor productivity, but 
could also be exacerbated by exogenous changes in price expectations. The 
main determinants of price expectations are: i) the average annual percentage 
of wages increases (usually determined by the minimum wage adjustment 
adopted by the government); ii) the nominal exchange depreciation (which 
is assumed to follow a "crawling peg" system); and Hi) the frequency of the 
readjustments (quarterly, monthly, etc.).
7 
The idea is that if institutional arrangements are made to brake indexa-
tion (e.g. lower frequency in the readjustments) and both the nominal wages 
and the nominal exchange depreciation are pre-fixed (the latter only when 
launching the program), price expectations and, consequently, inflation itself 
should decelerate. 
3.1.2. Exchanqe Rate 
As explained before, fixing the rate of depreciation (temporarily) should help 
to brake price "inertia". However, given that the feasible goal is not a 
zero-inflation-rate, authorities should not compromise in following any type 
of tablita or, otherwise, the real exchange rate would appreciate drastically. 
3.1.3. Money Nominal GDP and Wages 
Money expansion of Ml should adjust to nominal GDP increases, correct-
ing for movements in the money velocity. The latter variable is here 
determined by the nominal interest rate. The macroeconomic consistency 
of the model hinges on adjusting Ml expansion only to validate the level 
of prices and wages, with an exchange rate initially pre-fixed. Here the 
fiscal deficit plays a crucial role in avoiding any validation of higher than 
expected inflation or wages settlements. (This is not explicitly taken into 
account in the simulation). 
7 A more elaborated formalization of the effect of frequencies on the inflation 
process can be found in Modigliani and Padoa-Schioppa (1978). STABILIZATION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 219 
3.1.4. Interest Rates and Real Income 
Finally, we assumed that the uncovered interest rate parity condition holds, 
where the expected rate of depreciation is given by the "crawling-peg rule". 
Real income is determined then by the effect of the real interest rate and by 
the real exchange rate on the absorption components of the GDP. Finally, the 
level of real income also depends on the performance of aggregate demand, 
which is here captured through wages. 
3.2. Simulation Results 
The time unit are quarters and the initial values of the exogenous variables are: 
4% of real growth; 14% and 8% of observed and "natural" unemployment, 
respectively; 1.5% of increases in labor productivity; 5% of nominal foreign 
interest rate; and the frequency of price and wage adjustments is every 
semester (at the beginning of the program). 
Pre-fixed variables are: adjustments in prices, wages, and the nominal rate 
of depreciation; all set at 18% annually. The outcome variables are: domestic 
interest rate of 24% per-year; changes in money velocity (zero at the begin-
ning); increases in nominal GDP and Ml of 30%; and expected and observed 
inflation rate of 27% and 24%, respectively. 
Graph 1 illustrates how this disinflation program would require an 
increase in the nominal rate of depreciation of the home currency in the fourth 
quarter, since the observed inflation rate (24%) would be higher than the 
pre-fixed rate (18%). This fact would call for a correction of the real exchange 
rate, as shown in Graph 3. As mentioned before, this decision to increase the 
nominal rate of depreciation would affect negatively the credibility of the 
program if, at the outset, the government should have compromised to a 
tablita; however, this is not the case here. 
Due to this acceleration in the nominal rate of depreciation, both the 
expected and observed rate of inflation would increase (see Graph 1). How-
ever, if disindexing policies are successful (e.g. by frequency reductions), both 
the expected and observed inflation rates would decrease from the fifth 
quarter onwards. These process could be maintained during the second year 
of the program if monetary control is strictly exerted. 
The real exchange rate would depreciate by 5 percentage points and the 
real interest rate would decrease from 11% to 6%; both variables would spur 
GDP growth to 5% above its natural rate. The final rate of unemployment 
would be 8.5% and the average real wage would have increased at the end of 
the program due to the disinflation process (see Graphs 2 and 4), which would 
leave this economy at the one digit inflation rate level. 220 ESTUDIOS ECONÓMICOS 
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4. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis of some programs of stabilization and/or structural adjustment 
showed that reduction of the fiscal deficit and alignment of the real 
exchange rate are vital elements for success. It was illustrated the pos-
sibility of implementing a program of Combined orthodox and heterodox 
policies (as done in Israel) to avoid the traditional output costs that pure 
orthodox program usually entail. Colombia is another case where a successful 
orthodox structural-adjustment was implemented during the period 1984¬
1988 in which deep recession was avoided but problems of chronic infla-
tion persisted. 
Based on those experiences, a disinflation program of combined policies 
that managed expectations and control aggregate demand was sketched 
and simulated for a typical economic structure of a LDC. By pre-fixing the 
adjustment rates of some prices and the minimum wage, and (temporarily) 
the nominal rate of depreciation, it becomes possible to break price "iner-
tia" and to adopt policies of disindexation. Credibility and consistency 
continue to be the key elements of these type of programs. A combined 
policy program for disinflation could be the answer to overcome chronic 
inflation situations. 
Appendix 
The model used in section 3 is given by equations (1) to (7), where small and 
capital letters represent rates of growth and levels of the variables, respective-
ly. Greek letters represent positive parameters. 
In particular note that: (1) represents the "Augmented Phillips Curve" 
(a function of unemployment U and productivity changes o, where x is the 
augmentedexpectetions);(2)modelsxasafunctionofnominalwagesadjustment . 
rate w, the nominal exchange rate of depreciation e and the frequency of the 
adjustments F; (3) poses a rule to maintain the real exchange rate (RER); (4) 
shows w as depending on the rate of money expansion, which in turn is 
adjusted by the difference between the rate of growth of nominal GDP and 
money velocity changes; (5) spells out the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition, where i* - r (given that we assume p* = 0), hence e = p; and (6) 
refers to the level of real GDP as determined by the wages, the RER and the 
interest rate r. 
p = a¿U-U)-c + axx 
jr = p0w + p,É! + |$2F 
(1) 
(2) STABILIZATION POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 223 
e=o£(i-«>)''• -A  (3) 
where Vxt = *, _, and RER = E = E. P*/P 
w = m=p*y — v(i)  (4) 
i = i* + e = r + p  (5) 
Y=r0(u-u)+rlEr+r2/r  (6) 
In the simulations the parameters refer to short-run elasticities (e.g. 
v(. « .15, = .30, f30 = .30), but we played with different lagged structures of 
e, U and M to calibrate the model. 
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